The building - provides redundancy for the communication infrastructures installed at the entry to the building. The fiber optic cable tunnel enters an underground floor in the building through the building's perimeter moat, after passing through a double-plated wall.

 

Analysis of the route for electricity, air conditioning and fire extinguishing systems - leading from the project rooms to the generator, coolers and containers holding gas
extinguishing materials.

Electricity infrastructure - including the project rooms and an energy center featuring 2 generators to ensure a continuous energy supply, as well as electricity and switching panels, high voltage and low voltage transformers, and battery and UPS arrays, are of which all included within Med-1's underground facility (level 2) and are protected against all possible effects listed in the threat table. The project rooms and the cabling leading into them are also included in the underground (Level 2) facility, and feature the same level of protection.

This electricity system topology features 2 independent power feeding routes.
In terms of the power feeds, the facility receives electricity from the national Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) power grid, via two different substations; electricity cables are fed in via underground paths, and in the event of an external malfunction, emergency electricity is provided by two generators, which provide a continuous, uninterrupted power feed during the transfer from IEC power to generator power; each generator is capable of meeting the needs of the designated consumers and the data and monitoring systems. Electric panels for redundant telecommunication systems (fields A and B) can each distribute electricity to the telecommunication systems independently of one another. Electricity infrastructure - electric panels, transformers and generators are installed in an underground (-2) level in Wing B.

The underground energy system is located in Wing B, with a double plated wall separating the building from its surroundings. The generators are served by 2 underground diesel containers with a holding capacity of 30 tons each, installed in an underground structure made of reinforced concrete, which also includes an appropriate waste container. The containers' holding capacity allows the generators to operate continuously for 10 working days without external refueling.
Air conditioning systems - the system is designed to operate according to a plan guaranteeing redundancy at a level of n+1. Current cooling method - an air treatment system installed in the building's yard, including condensers and air treatment units.
The building's water systems include water containers in case of emergency, including for the use of the building's staff and for fire extinguishing purposes:

1. A container with a holding capacity of 30 cubic meters for use of the staff; this amount can supply the water needs of 15 staff members for over 20 days.
2. A container with a holding capacity of 100 cubic meters for fire extinguishing purposes, in addition to hydrant systems in the building's yard and the internal fire extinguishing system.
Analysis of the physical obstacles, monitoring, detection and observational tools in each of the paths enabling access to the project rooms, or of components that are critical for their operation (as described in paragraphs 1 and 2 above), including hallways, doors and windows.

Several protective layers and access controls are used around the project rooms:

A. An external fence whose gates (and cameras and spotlights) can be remotely controlled and operated from two monitoring stations - the monitoring center, located in an underground floor of the building, and the security guard station at the entrance.

B. An aboveground structure whose doors can be remotely controlled and operated using an access control / CCTV system from two monitoring stations - the monitoring center, located in an underground floor of the building, and the security guard station at the entrance.

C. Entrance and movement throughout the building are possible only after one to one identification and authentication of access rights has been done by the security guard. Movement of visitors throughout the building is limited by code-monitored permissions.

D. Access to the data center rooms is monitored and controlled by the security guard situated in the monitoring center, and is secured by a double-door security portal, including double monitoring.

E. Access to the project rooms is only possible after permission has been received and the entry door to the project area has been unlocked.

F. Access to the energy area - including power rooms, electricity panels, generators and battery backup systems - is monitored using door access control permissions to Wing B.

G. Access to a designated elevator for bringing equipment into the building is also controlled and monitored using permissions by the monitoring center.

H. Access to the openings leading to the diesel containers for use of the generators are also controlled and monitored using permissions by the monitoring center.

I. The entry pathway for the Electric Corporation's feed-in line to the meter room is also monitored and controlled by the monitoring center.

Analysis was performed of the ability of the entire site, and of the project rooms contained within it, to withstand threats involving an external explosion as specified for each of the threats included on the list, including a direct attack on critical points in the building, penetration through unprotected openings (doors / balconies) and internal explosions. Other scenarios were also taken into account, including an explosion in the building's proximity and an underground explosion near the building's walls. The designated areas within the facility - including the data center and energy areas - are located in underground levels, within an internal structure encased in an external envelope of reinforced concrete - providing a very high level of protection against the aforementioned threats.